Diego Pérez de Mesa’s ‘Política o razón de Estado’ and the Medieval Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s Politics by Lanza, Lidia
Patrística et Mediaevalia, XXXVIII (2017)
DIEGO PÉREZ DE MESA’S PQLÎTICA O RAZÔN
DE ESTADO  AND THE MEDIEVAL COMMENTARY 
TRADITION ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS
L idia Lanza*
Diego Pérez de Mesa’s Work on Politics
The historiography devoted to early modern political thought 
tends to see the emergence of the literary genre of reason of state 
in relation to the end of medieval “Political Aristotelianism”1. Yet, 
in the work of the Spaniard Diego Pérez de Mesa, entitled Política 
o razón de Estado sacada de Aristóteles (that is Politics or Reason 
of State Taken from Aristotle), reason of state is strictly yoked to 
the Politics of Aristotle.
Mathematician, astronomer and historiographer, Diego Pérez 
de Mesa composed this work almost certainly between 1623 and 
1625, long after his retirement from his academic position as pro­
fessor of mathematics and astronomy at the Universities of Alca­
lá and Seville2. In both his scientific and historical works, Pérez 
de Mesa shows a pragmatic approach to the subject he is dealing 
with: whenever possible, he adduces his personal observations and
* Universidade do Porto.
1 See for instance the essays collected in Artemio Enzo Baldini (ed.), Aristo- 
telismopolitico e ragion di stato: atti del conuegno inter nazionale di Torino, 11-13 
febbraio, Olschki, Firenze 1995, Given the limited length of this article, the bibli­
ographical indications are rather reduced.
2 For his biography, see Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política o razón de Estado, ed. by 
L. Pereña and C. Baciero, with the collaboration of V. Abril, A. García, F. Maseda, 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1980, pp. XIII-XXXI. But 
see also the more recent José María Ortiz de Zárate Leira, “Manuscrito con obras 
atribuidas a Diego Pérez de Mesa en la Biblioteca Histórica de la Universidad 
Complutense”, in Francisco A. González Redondo (ed.), Ciencia y técnica entre la 
paz y la guerra. 1714, 1814, 1914, Sociedad Española de la Historia de las Ciencias 
y de las Técnicas, Madrid 2015, Vol. 2, pp. 1141-1148.
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experience either to confirm or to disprove earlier theories and opi­
nions. Scholars have already pointed out how much this attitude 
is consistent with the trend fostered by Philip II in the teaching 
of mathematics-related subjects3. When employed with regard to 
historical matters, this approach reveals itself to be all the more 
significant to understand the use made in the Política o razón de 
Estado of theories taken from Aristotle’s Politics.
In composing the Política o razón de Estado, Pérez de Mesa 
benefits from the vast historical information he had previously ga­
thered while he was preparing the expanded and revised version 
of Pedro de Medina’s Libro de las grandezas y cosas notables de 
España4. Besides this, he also draws on his own personal political 
experience. As counsellor to Cardinal Gaspar Borja y Velasco, who 
was the Spanish Ambassador in Rome on more than one occasion 
and Viceroy of Naples in 1620, Pérez de Mesa spent a long time in 
Italy. Pérez de Mesa knew well Italian political history, which is 
evident from the high number of examples he adduces from Italian 
history, almost equivalent to the high number of examples taken 
from Spanish history. Contemporary Italian and Spanish history 
supply Pérez de Mesa with examples of regimes and political chan­
ges which he employs to update the conclusions of Aristotle. We 
can thus conclude that his career permitted him to gain experience 
related to the political processes that are at the core of the Política 
o razón de Estado, namely the causes that enable different political 
regimes (monarchy, republic, oligarchy and so on) to remain stable 
over long periods of time and the discussion about the forces that 
can undermine or even dissolve each of those regimes.
It is not hard to grasp how all this content fits in a work be­
longing, as is clear from its title, to the literary genre of reason of 
state, that is, a group of works mainly written in Italy by the early 
seventeenth century which bear in their title the expression ragion 
di stato. Pérez de Mesa’s Política displays the main features of the
3 Victor Navarro-Brotóns, “The Cultivation of Astronomy in Spanish Universi­
ties in the Latter Half of the 16th Century”, in Mordechai Feingold and Victor Na­
varro-Brotons (eds.), Universities and Science in the Early Modern Period, Springer, 
Dordrecht 2006, pp. 83-98.
4 Pérez de Mesa’s rewriting of Pedro de Medina's Libro de las grandezas y 
cosas notables de España amounts to almost twice the number of pages of the editio 
princeps of Medina’s work, issued in 1548. In his revision, Pérez de Mesa moves 
between an obsequious reverence towards the text he is reworking and an attempt 
to correct it with the fresh historical evidence he brings.
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standard characterisation of this genre: it is a reflection on political 
power, intended for princes and their advisers, grounded in expe­
rience and history, and as such dismissive of any reflection that may 
be regarded as lacking practical usefulness5. But precisely because 
Pérez de Mesa bases his work on the Politics of Aristotle, which 
is explicitly acknowledged in the title, the question that arises is 
to which extent is his practical aim consistent with the purposes, 
method and topics that are found in Aristotle’s Politics.
The aim of this article is therefore to analyse to which extent 
the text of the Politics supplies the theoretical grounds on which 
Pérez de Mesa constructs his work and justifies his assertions. The 
Politics has been used by different authors in a wide range of con­
texts and with different purposes since its translation into Latin 
in the 1260s, but as yet no study has concentrated on how it might 
have been used in a reason-of-state work. This inquiry may permit 
us to assess to which extent and in which way we should connect 
the end of “Political Aristotelianism” with the appearance of the 
reason of state.
It suffices to look at the titles and order of the chapters of the 
Política o razón de Estado to notice the similarity between this work 
and the Politics. Thus, the question is whether Pérez de Mesa limits 
himself to following the order of the topics he finds in Aristotle’s 
work and, if so, whether he merely fills the template with content 
taken from other sources and from his own political experience. This 
would in turn give rise to a further question, namely to which extent 
Pérez de Mesa remains faithful to the principles and approach of 
the authoritative text he relies on or whether he adjusts it according 
to his own agenda.
Such questions are not unique to Pérez de Mesa but can be 
extended to any medieval and early modern author who advanced
5 Here I draw on the recent entry: Harro Hopfl, “Reason of State”, in Henrik 
Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 
1500, Springer, Dordrecht -  Heidelberg -  London -  New York 2011, pp. 1113- 
1115. The bibliography on the reason of state is legion, In addition to the volume 
mentioned in note 1 and to the bibliography collected in a website specifically- 
dedicated to the reason of state and updated to 2007 (http://www.filosofia.unina.it/ 
ars/bibrds.pdf, last retrieved in April 2017), see the following studies where further 
bibliography may be found: Michael Stolleis, Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen 
Neuzeit: Studien zur Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt .am 
Main 1990; Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and 
Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992.
36 LIDIA IjANZA
political standpoints based on Aristotle’s Politics. Unlike the com­
mentators on Aristotle’s Politics who had to focus principally on 
interpreting the text of the Politics, an author who made use of the 
Politics for his own purposes and with his own agenda needed to 
adapt the Politics to his own time and aims6. In doing so, he might 
select some sections-theoretical assertions, historical examples™* 
while dropping others and he might add or change the material 
he found in the Politics. As far as the Política o razón de Estado is 
concerned, it is precisely these kinds of strategies that resulted in 
the effects described below.
Pérez de Mesa drops that which has no relevance to an unders­
tanding of the Aristotelian theory of the state, or at least that which 
appears as not immediately related to that. In this sense, he leaves 
aside the entire Book II of the Politics, wherein Aristotle discusses 
the political regimes existing in his own time (Sparta, Crete and 
Carthage) and the regimes proposed in the works of previous authors 
(Plato, Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus), Pérez de 
Mesa also discards Book VI, in which Aristotle adds further elements 
to the analysis of the different kinds of democracy and oligarchy. 
Most likely, Pérez de Mesa might have thought that Book VI does not 
bring anything that could not be found in Books III and IV7.
With regard to the remaining books of the Politics—whose con­
tent is followed and quoted to a smaller or greater extent—Pérez 
de Mesa relies completely on Aristotle. The analysis of the work’s 
arrangement shows that Pérez de Mesa also follows the order of the 
books of the Politics. Exceptions to this order are few, one of the 
most remarkable being the discussion on the acquisition of wealth 
and on how it should be done—in which conditions such acquisition 
is good, necessary or useful, and in which conditions it is a misa­
pplication of natural resources aiming to a goal which is a goal in 
itself and not a means towards a further goal. While in Aristotle’s 
Politics this discussion occurs in Book I, Chapters 8 to 11, in Pérez 
de Mesa’s work the acquisition of wealth is discussed in connection
6 On the medieval reception of the Politics and more specifically on the com­
mentary tradition on this work, see Lidia Lanza, ‘Ei autem qui de politia considerar. 
Aristotele nel pensiero politico medievale, FID EM, Barcelona-Madrid 2013 and the 
bibliography quoted there.
7 See Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit, capp. XXI-XXII, pp. 134-139, where 
Diego Pérez de Mesa deals with the different species of democracy and oligarchy 
basing his statements on Books III and IV of the Politics.
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with the best political regime (which in turn is addressed in Book 
VII of the Politics)8.
These kinds of changes are not problematic: after all, a similar 
rearrangement is common practice among all authors who rely and 
make use of an authoritative text but not for the purpose of produ­
cing a commentary on it. Moreover, in this specific case, namely that 
the acquisition of wealth is not discussed in relation with the topics 
of Book I but rather with Book VII of the Politics, the displacement 
is even less problematic, because in the Politics the discussion on 
the material conditions required for establishing the best possible 
polity entails a discussion on the population (on its number and on 
the disposition of the citizens) and on the region in which the regime 
is to be established (namely, on the size and features of the land). 
The fact that a given territory falls short of all that is necessary 
to the population of the best polity implies that the city needs to 
promote trade and exchange activities. This explains why the study 
of the best polity involves a consideration of issues connected with 
the acquisition of wealth, risks and benefits of trade and exchange 
activities, and the role of wealth in such activities.
However, apart from this and other minor changes, Pérez de 
Mesa’s work follows the order of Aristotle’s Politics. But beyond this 
closeness between the arrangement of the Politics and that of the 
Política o razón de Estado, it is apparent that for the main tenets 
of his work Pérez de Mesa relies not only on Aristotle, but also on 
“Aristotelianism”. I mean Aristotelianism and not solely Aristotle, 
because the fact that the structure of the Política o razón de Estado 
is based on the Politics does not tell us of itself that Pérez de Mesa 
draws directly on the text of the Politics; Pérez de Mesa might have 
used an intermediate text, through which lens he might have read 
the Politics. In this case, we. should ask which the intermediate 
text or texts are and to which extent they shape the reading of 
Pérez de Mesa. There is a more or less implicit scholarly position 
that the Politics was accessed directly by its medieval and early 
modern readers; in fact, numerous studies dedicated to the assess­
ment of the impact of the Politics fail to consider the importance 
that the commentary tradition on the Politics might have had. It is 
beyond any doubt that, during the Middle Ages and at least until 
the end of the sixteenth century, the most important commentary 
on the Politics was the thirteenth-century commentary started by
8 Ibidem, pp. 305-312.
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Aquinas and finished by Peter of Auvergne, This commentary was 
far more influential than the commentary produced by Albert the 
Great. It was quoted, reproduced or used, explicitly or not, by later 
commentators such as Guido Vernani da Rimini, Walter Burley and 
Nicole Oresme. It was also extensively used by Marsilius of Padua 
and William of Ockham. In the Renaissance, the Aquinas-Peter 
of Auvergne commentary was greatly used by authors from two 
geographical areas in which Pérez de Mesa made his career; Spain 
and Italy. By way of example, it was used by Alfonso de Cartagena 
in his moral works and by Pedro de Osma and Fernando de Roa, 
two fifteenth-century Salamancan professors who produced a sig­
nificant commentary on the Politics. In Italy, the Aquinas—Peter of 
Auvergne commentary was the source of later commentaries, such 
as that by Donato Acciaiuoli, written in Florence between 1472 and 
1474, and that by the Dominican Crisostomo Javelli, master in the 
studium of Bologna9, Furthermore, beyond either the university 
commentary tradition or the practice of teaching in the studio, of 
religious orders, it was also used, for instance, in a variety of works 
in vernacular which rearranged the text of the Politics and which 
were aimed at broader audiences, beyond higher-education reader- 
ship10, The Aquinas-Peter of Auvergne commentary was even used 
in the work Trattati o vero discorsi sopra gli ottimi reggimenti delle 
repubbliche antiche e moderne, composed by the Florentine author 
Bartolomeo Cavalcanti. Intended to sustain republican ideals, this 
work can be defined as a mid-term between a rearrangement of and 
a commentary on the Politics and on other ancient authors, such as 
Plato and Polybius11.
9 On the influence of this commentary, see Lidia Lanza, “The Scriptum super 
III-VIII libros Politicorum, Some Episodes of its Fortune until the Early Renais­
sance”, in Christoph Fliieler -  Lidia Lanza -  Marco Tosté (eds,), Peter of Auvergne. 
University Master o f the 13th Century, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin -  New York 2015, 
pp. 255-319.
10 This is the case of the works written in vernacular by Bernardo Segni, 
Lodovico Dolce, Antonio Scaino, Jason Denores, Felice Figliucci, Nikola Vitos 
Gucetic (Niccolò Vito di Gozze), Francesco Piccolomini and Panfilo Pérsico, pro­
duced in Italy between 1549 and 1627. On these works, see Marco Tosté, “Evolution 
within Tradition: The Vernacular Works on Aristotle’s Politics in Sixteenth-Century 
Italy”, in Gianluca Briguglia and Thomas Ricklin (eds.), Thinking Politics in the 
VernacularFrom the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Academic Press Fribourg, 
Fribourg (Suisse) 2011, pp. 189-211.
u  On Cavalcanti, see Lidia Lanza, “Firenze e la lezione degli antichi: i Trattati 
di Bartolomeo Cavalcanti” , in Briguglia and Ricklin (eds,), Thinking Politics in the
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Pérez de Mesa might have used any of these texts in his reading 
of the Politics. However, of all these authors, he refers explicitly to 
only two: Thomas Aquinas and Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, Cavalcanti 
is quoted just once, in a short remark on the differences between 
Aristotle’s and Plato’s views regarding the parts which every state 
necessarily consists of. Despite its brevity, this mention suffices 
to assert that Cavalcanti is one of Pérez de Mesa’s sources12. Sig­
nificantly, Cavalcanti and Pérez de Mesa share some similarities 
in their approach to Aristotle’s Politics13. By contrast, the Aquí- 
nas-Peter of Auvergne commentary plays a major role in Pérez de 
Mesa’s text. It is not merely quoted: it is used as the essential tool 
to understand Aristotle’s text.
A clarification is necessary here: Pérez de Mesa quotes the com­
mentary just mentioned under the name of Thomas Aquinas and he 
never refers to Peter of Auvergne. This is because, as is well known, 
the whole commentary was printed, from its first printing edition in 
1492 and in all successive editions, under the name of Aquinas. The­
refore, the name of Peter disappeared as the author of the commen­
tary on the greater part of Book III and on Books IV up to VIII14. If we 
recall that Pérez de Mesa disregards the second book of the Politics
Vernacular, cit., pp. 167-188. The critical edition of Cavalcanti’s work is found in: 
Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, Trattati o vero Discorsi sopra gli ottimi reggimenti delle 
repubbliche antiche e moderne, ed. Enrica Fabbri, Franco Angeli, Milano 2007.
12 The reference to Cavalcanti occurs in the passage in which Pérez de Mesa 
asserts that the judges must be included among the necessary parts of the state. 
For Pérez de Mesa, the reason that Socrates via Plato had adduced for their exclu­
sion—a reason mentioned by Cavalcanti—is not convincing: ‘'La sexta parte son 
ios jueces, porque, aunque Sócrates en la República de Platón no los pone, no se 
puede excusar con la salva de Cavalcanti y outros autores” ; cf. Diego Pérez de Mesa, 
Política, cit., cap. XXX, pp. 189-190, The passage of Cavalcanti referred to occurs at 
Trattato terzodecimo; cf. Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, Trattati o vero Discorsi, cit., p. 202.
13 Both works can be considered a sort of condensed commentary on Politics, 
both use Peter of Auvergne’s commentary as the commentary and both focus princi­
pally on Books IV-V of the Politics. Bartolomeo Cavalcanti draws on these books in 
his attempt to explain why republicanism in Florence came to an end and gave place 
to the authoritarian rule of Cosimo I de’ Medici; by contrast, Pérez de Mesa has 
before him a political reality in which all countries aim to expand their boundaries; 
therefore, they need, on the one hand, to block revolutions and internal seditions 
(even cultural diversity is seen as a risk to the state’s stability) and, on the other 
hand, to avoid any possible attack from other countries.
14 In their Pré face to the critical edition of Thomas Aquinas’ commentary 
on Aristoteles’s Politics, which covers only Books Í-III.8 of the Aristotelian text, 
Antoine Dondaine and Louis-Jacques Bataillon carefully investigate the different
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and that he only touches on a few topics from the first book, namely 
the definition of the state, the parts that constitute the household 
and the political community, the naturalness of human association 
and the definition of slave15, then we can conclude that he draws far 
more on Peter of Auvergne’s commentary than on Aquinas’,
Pérez de Mesa quotes explicitly Peter’s commentary (under the 
name of Thomas Aquinas) just a few times (the work’s index records 
just six entries). However, a comparison between the two works offers 
a totally different picture, since it is through the commentary of Peter 
that Pérez de Mesa accesses Aristotle’s Politics, Evidence of this is 
found with regard to both the content and the arrangement of this 
content: Peter’s commentary supplies the philosophical substantia­
tions found in Pérez de Mesa’s text and the presentation of Aristotle’s 
lines of reasoning is made according to the arrangement made by 
Peter. What is more, Pérez de Mesa reproduces word by word entire 
sections of Peter of Auvergne’s work without referencing it. Here I 
shall point out just a few examples of this use of Peter’s commentary.
Chapter 14 of the first part of Política o razón de Estado deals 
with the end which forms the aim of civil laws, and with the practice 
of ostracism16. This chapter is a representative sample of the mul­
tiple ways in which Pérez de Mesa uses Peter’s commentary, since 
it is almost completely made of assertions taken from Chapter 12 of 
Book III of Peter of Auvergne’s commentary. Only one assertion is
editorial phases which Aquinas’ commentary passed through (their examination 
includes the commentary of Peter of Auvergne which covers Books III-VIII); ef. 
Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, Tabula libri Ethicorum, ed. Antoine 
Dondaine and Louis-Jacques Bataillon (Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, 
t, 48), ad Sanctam Sabinam, Boma 1971; Préface, pp, A15-A21. For many of their 
assertions they draw on the previous investigation carried out by Conor Martin; 
cf. Conor Martin, ‘The Vulgate Text of Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Poli­
tics” , Dominican Studies 5 (1952) 35-64. These studies have shown that numerous 
passages of the Aquinas—Peter of Auvergne commentary have been suppressed 
or modified according to humanist standards from the 1492 edition onwards. The 
edition usually used by scholarship depends on these earlier editions and for this 
reason it is not reliable (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis In octo libros Politicorum Aris­
totelis expositio, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Torino -  Roma 1951, 21966). I 
have been preparing the critical edition of Peter’s commentary which will appear 
under the title Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum, ed, 
Lidia Lanza, Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden 2018. All the references to Peter’s com­
mentary are based on my edition. However, since it is still forthcoming, I shall 
indicate between brackets the corresponding page and numbers of Spiazzi's edition.
15 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit, capp. I-IV, pp. 11-36.
16 Ibid,, cap. XIV, pp. 90-100,
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presented as a direct quotation, while all the others are reproduced 
as if they were conclusions drawn by Pérez de Mesa himself. The 
topic debated in this chapter regards the case of the most excellent 
man who exceeds all others in virtue and the related questions as 
to whether such a man should be elected as ruler of the political 
community and whether such a man should be included among 
the citizens. Before presenting his own solution, Peter of Auvergne 
states that a man who exceeds all others in virtue must not be con­
sidered a citizen because such a man is likely to be almost a god. 
In fact, he can reach a degree of moral virtue which is more divine 
than human; to substantiate this, Peter makes use of the Aristote­
lian notion of heroic virtue found in Chapter 1 of Book VIII of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (1145al8-30). For Peter,
someone can attain to perfect virtue and act for himself in two 
ways: either through the common condition of human beings, or be­
yond the common manner or condition of human beings. This comes 
about through heroic virtue. Virtue is heroic when someone, by means 
of moral and intellectual virtue, attains the operation of any virtue 
that is above the common human condition. This is something divine 
because it comes to exist in a human by means of something divine, 
which is the intellect; so the Philosopher here says. Such a man, so 
surpassing all others, he says, exists as a god17.
If such a man exists, surpassing all others in virtue,
he should not to be driven out of the city, or transported elsewhe­
re: for this is against reason, because he is the most virtuous man 
[...]. Nor should he be appointed to the ruling office as others are, so 
that he would rule at one time and not at another. It would be as if 
we wanted Jove to rule at ope time and not at another, and this is
17 I have taken the English translation of this passage from Medieval P o­
litical Philosophy. A Sourcebook (2nd Edition), ed. by Joshua Parens and Joseph 
C. Macfarland, 1st edition edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY -  London, 2011, p. 302. The translation is based on 
my forthcoming edition: “aliquis potest attingere ad uirtutem perfectam et actum 
ipsius dupliciter: uno modo secundum statum commune humanum; alio modo ultra 
communem modum uel statum humanum: hoc autem fit per uirtutem eroycam. Est 
autem uirtus heroyca secundum quam aliquis per uirtutem moralem et intellectua- 
lem attingit ad operationem cuiuslibet uirtutis supra communem modum hominum; 
hoc autem est aliquod esse diuinum, quia fit per aliquid diuinum in hominé exi- 
stens, quod est intellectus: sic loquitur hie Philosophus, Talem enim hominem, et 
sic excedentem omnes alios, dicit esse sicut deum” (Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, 
cit., Ill, cap. 12; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 165, nr. 463).
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ridiculous. And thus what is left, when such a man is the best, what 
is just and worthy, is for all to obey him joyfully so that he would be 
king; or, if there were several, that they would be kings and rulers, 
not sometimes so and sometimes not, but always18.
Pérez de Mesa repeats this line of reasoning, but with no refe­
rence to his source19.
There is still another way in which, in this same chapter, Pérez 
de Mesa draws on Peter, namely by using his terminology. Like 
other commentators on the Politics, such as Aquinas, Peter makes 
extensive use of the distinction between what is good or true sim~ 
pliciter and what is so only secundum quid. Expressed in these 
terms, such a distinction is absent from the text of the Politics, 
but it became the tool medieval authors used to resolve many con­
troversial issues found in the text of Aristotle20. Pérez de Mesa 
employs this distinction with the same purpose. This occurs in the 
chapter devoted to the definition of citizen21 and in the account of
18 Medieval Political Philosophy, cit., p. 304. “Non enim dicendum est quod de­
beat expelli a ciuitate et transferri ad alium locum: hoc enim est contra rationem, ex 
quo est optimus, quare nullo modo est expellendus; iterum, non est assumendus ad 
principatum sicut alii, ut quandoque principetur quandoque non: simile enim esset 
ac si uellemus principan Iouem aliquando et aliquando non: hoc enim derisorium 
est. Et ideo relinquitur quod, cum talis sit optimus, quod dignum et iustum est quod 
omnes sibi letanter obediant et ut sit rex uel, si sint tales plures, quod sint reges 
et principantes, non aliquando sic aliquando non, sed semper'’ (Petrus de Alvemia, 
Scriptum, cit., Ill, cap. 12; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 166, nr. 473).
19 Ibid., p. 96.
20 This occurs for instance with regard to the notion of prudence. The com­
mentators on the Politics came to establish a prudentia secundum quid which may 
be detached from the moral virtues, involves wicked acts and therefore differs 
from the prudence simpliciter, which is always necessarily connected to the moral 
virtues. On this, see Marco Tosté, “Virtue and the City: The Virtues of the Ruler 
and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of the Politics” , in István P. Bejczy and 
Cary J. Nedermán (eds.), Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500, Brepols, 
Turnhout 2007, pp. 75-98.
21 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit., cap. V, p. 39: “[...] todos estos sobredichos 
absolutamente [ -  los muchachos y las mujeres y los que por alguna enfermedad 
o por decrépitos o faltos de juicio no pueden ejercitar algún cargo público} no son 
ciudadanos sino secundum quid, esto es, con adición de alguna palabra restrictiva, 
como ciudadano imperfecto y ciudadano en el nombre”. For the corresponding text 
of Peter of Auvergne see Book III, cap. 1. Peter’s first six chapters are not included 
in Spiazzi’s edition; they are edited in; The Commentary o f Peter o f Auvergne on 
Aristotle’s ‘Politics’. The Inedited Part: Book 111, less. I-VL Introduction and Criti­
cal Text, ed. Gundisalvus M. Grech, Desclée -  Pontifical University of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Rome 1967 (see p. 78,11. 1-4).
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the justice which is specific to each form of government: in some 
regimes there is a justice secundum quid and not simpliciter good; 
in this kind of regime ostracism of the most virtuous man may be 
beneficial in order to preserve the state, even though this procedure 
is not simpliciter good.
Still in the same chapter, there are other implicit references to 
Peter’s commentary. In the closing lines of the chapter, Pérez de 
Mesa replies to some possible objections regarding the lordship of 
the most excellent man. Should such a man hold power alone, all 
other citizens would feel disregarded (resterían sin gozar de aquella 
honra, in Latin dishonorati), since they would not have access to 
the highest public office (note that the word honor/timé is the term 
used in the Greek text to denote both the political office and the 
honour that anyone holding such an office deserves). However, for 
Pérez de Mesa, such a risk does not occur, since the political regime 
in which the most excellent man holds the highest office is the best 
political regime, which is constituted according to moral virtues. In 
such a regime, therefore, everyone recognises his own moral rank 
and the honours that he deserves according to his own merit and 
therefore accepts that a superior man may receive a higher honour. 
In this sense, no man is dishonoured. This line of reasoning is taken 
almost verbatim from Peter of Auvergne and again silently: both 
the objections and its solutions are given as considerations of Pérez 
de Mesa himself22.
In other cases, Pérez de Mesa approaches the text of Peter in a 
different way. On occasion, he explicitly mentions Peter (or rather 
Aquinas) and on a number of occasions to criticise him.
22 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit,, cap, XIV, p. 100: “Y tampoco repugna que 
teniendo el supremo gobierno uno solo, los otros todos siendo libres y hábiles a la 
pública administración, resterían sin jgozar de aquella honra; porque se responde a 
esto que con la república bien ordenada, la cual se gobierna con virtud y todos usan 
de ella, cada caso se mide prudentemente y se contenta con aquel cargo y honra que 
se debe a su grado, y gusta que el que tiene más altos quilates de merecimientos 
goce de mayores dignidades y honras sin que en eso haya fastidio, envidia notable o 
quejas” . Peter of Auvergne expressed this idea as follows: “Nec ualet quod secundo 
obiciebatur, quod, si unus uel plures principarentur, quod omnes alii essent inho- 
norati, quia in politia recte ordinata quilíbet diligit statum et gradum propnum 
et gradum alterius, et ideo uult honorem sibi secundum gradum suum et uult alii 
honorem secundum gradum illius, nec uult sibi honorem alterius. Et ideo, si sit unus 
exeellens omnes in uirtute, omnes uolunt sibi honorem qui debetur ei, et ideo non 
sunt inhonorati, quia quilibet habet honorem qui debetur ei” (Petrus de Alvernia, 
Scriptum, cit., Ill, cap. 12; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 167, nr. 473).
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This is noticeable once again in the same chapter, where he 
deals with the case of the most excellent man and his role in the 
political community. Pérez de Mesa refers to Peter's commentary 
when he recalls the objection raised by Aristotle: if such a man 
shall have a supreme and perpetual rule, then dissension may ari­
se in the city, because all others, excluded from access to lordship, 
may feel disregarded. This is in fact one of the main causes of any 
dissension23. Pérez de Mesa retells Peter of Auvergne’s solution, 
which occurs in a lengthy notabile of Peter’s commentary where 
Peter argues in favour of kingship as the best political regime. Peter 
reasons that kingship is the regime which “comes nearer to natural 
lordship ¡principatus naturalis] and to the lordship of the universe 
[principatus universi]”, because both animals and the universe are 
governed by one ruler; the animal body is ruled by the heart, becau­
se it is from the heart that the entire body and each of its individual 
parts receives its strength; likewise, in the universe there is only 
one ruler, on which the entire universe depends24.
Referring to this line of reasoning, Pérez de Mesa acknowledges 
his source, but states that Peter’s argument is useless. It is useless 
to recall the organisation of the universe to substantiate the supe­
riority of one man over others, he affirms, since everybody intuiti­
23 Aristotles’s Politics 111, 1281a32-34. Peter of Auvergne underscores the risk 
of upheavals when the highest honour is assigned to a few or to a single man: “non 
expedit unum uirtuosum ualde principari, quia, si unus ualde uirtuosus domine- 
tur, plures erunt inhonorati, <quia priuantur> honore principatus. Sed hoc est 
inconueniens: ex hoc enim sequntur dissensiones in ciuitate et turbationes, sicut 
dictum est” (Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, cit,, III, cap. 8; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 147, 
nr. 420). Some lines earlier, Peter had underlined that same risk with reference 
to the rulership of the virtuous men, be they many or just a few: the cause that 
triggers dissension is always the disregard felt by those excluded from the public 
offices (= honours) and, consequently, from the honour which follows from these 
offices ( -  honor): “si soli uirtuosi principentur, omnes alii erunt inhonorati, quia 
non attingunt ad honorem principatus, quia principatus honores sunt: sunt enim 
premium uirtutis, et hoc est honor, sicut dicitur primo et 4° Ethicorum; ergo qui non 
attingit ad principatum non attingit ad honorem. Principantibus igitur uirtuosis, 
remanent alii inhonorati; sed hoc est inconueniens. Est enim hoc causa dissensionis: 
omnes enim appetunt honorem naturaliter, propter quod appetunt honorari a bonis 
et sapientibus, qui melius et rectius possunt iudicare. Si ergo auferatur eis honor, 
sequitur dissensio et multa mala in ciuitate. Quare non est iustum uirtuosos do­
minari” (Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, cit., ibid.; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 147, nr, 419).
24 Ibid,, III, cap. 12; cf. Spiazzi 21966, p. 167, nr. 473. Diego Pérez de Mesa, 
Política, cap. XIV, pp. 96-97.
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vely acknowledges and tacitly gives consent (por instinto y tácito 
consentimiento) whenever someone surpasses others in one domain, 
and this holds for every human activity. It is no coincidence, says 
Pérez de Mesa, that Aristotle is regarded as the Philosopher par 
excellence, just as in astrology the prominence is given to Ptolemy, 
in medicine to Hippocrates and Galen, in poetry to Homer and Vir­
gil, in military art to the Romans, and in knowledge and skill in 
arms and duelling to Carranza-here Pérez de Mesa mentions one 
example from his contemporary reality25. For the same reason, says 
Pérez de Mesa, the men who reached the highest degree of moral 
virtue are venerated as saints, by common people and kings alike, 
irrespective of whether they have or have not been canonised by 
the Pope26.
To sum up: for Pérez de Mesa, excellence is self-evident in any 
kind of activity and is immediately acknowledged. The same holds 
for the city: the man who is superior prevails and on account of his 
prominence ought to be made the supreme ruler27: there is no need 
to substantiate this superiority by providing sound arguments and 
in this way turning it into a philosophical question, when it is a 
simple matter-of-fact question.
“El rey ideal de Aristóteles”
This slight criticism does not change the fact that for Pérez de 
Mesa, as well as for Peter of Auvergne, monarchy is the best politi­
cal regime. This criticism is rather an indicator of the gap between 
Pérez de Mesa’s and Peter of Auvergne’s conceptions of ruler. As the 
most important commentator of the medieval commentary tradition 
on Aristotle’s Politics (concemiiig Books III-VHI), Peter of Auvergne 
defends monarchy as the most perfect form of government, provided
25 This is Jerónimo Sánchez de Carranza, whose work on fencing and military 
art, entitled De la filosofía de las armas y de su destreza y la aggression y defensa 
cristiana, was issued in 1569,
26 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit, cap. XIV, pp. 96-100.
27 Ibid., p. 99: “De manera que por instinto y consentimiento común de todas 
las gentes la virtud eminente tiene el imperio, y todos los demás grados inferiores 
de ella se le sujetan de suyo, la obedecen y reverencian. Demás de esto, en todo 
género de cosas, lo que es más levantado y excelente y más llegado a la suprema 
perfección de aquel género gobierna y rige todos los inferiores grados, como fácil­
mente se prueba See ibid., pp. 99-100.
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that one key criterion is met: ¿/there is a man who has reached the 
highest degree of moral perfection, then he should be made king; 
if not, another political regime should be adopted. Which kind of 
regime (forma) depends upon the material components (materia) 
the legislator has at his disposal-the degree of virtue of the citizens 
and a complex variety of cultural, historical, geographical, and even 
climatic circumstances.
The king depicted in Peter’s commentary, as well as in the bulk 
of the medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, implies an 
exceptional degree of moral virtue. Precisely for this reason it risks 
remaining an empty class: being almost a divine man-Peter uses the 
word semideas—his perfection proves almost unattainable in reality 
and comes to be perceived as a theoretical fiction. Such a difficulty is 
already tackled in Giles of Rome’s mirror for prince; writing at almost 
the same time as Peter of Auvergne, Giles copes with this difficulty 
and portrays the king’s virtue with more realistic strokes28. Pérez 
de Mesa stresses this difficulty even more than Giles of Rome: his 
pragmatic attitude of grounding his affirmations in experience and 
history leads him to characterise the “Aristotelian king” as comple­
tely unrealistic. In discussing the third cause of the conservation of 
hereditary monarchies, which is identified with the attempt to make 
the heirs acquainted with a ministerial and not with a patrimonial 
conception of kingly power and which entails ruling in conformity 
with the law, Pérez de Mesa argues that any attempt to raise the 
king’s heirs to the highest degree of virtue and to provide them with 
all the means to reach Aristotle’s ideal king is useless, because such 
an ideal cannot be achieved, even if one lived for 200 years29.
28 On this, see Diego Quaglioni, “Regimen ad populum e regimen regis in 
Egidio Romano e Bartolo da Sassoferrato”, Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano 
per il Medioevo e Archiuio Muratoriano 87 (1978) 201-228. I have underlined this 
aspect of Giles of Rome’s conception of the king’s virtue in Lidia Lanza, “I commenti 
medievali alia Política e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII-XIV)”, in 
Ead., ‘Ei autem qui de politica considerat’, cit., pp. 115-137 (see esp. pp. 136-137). 
This characterisation becomes apparent in the section in which Giles discusses the 
means and stratagems which, according to Aristotle, tyrants should use in order to 
preserve their power, irrespective of their moral goodness (these are the so-called 
cautelae tyrannicae). See Aegidii Romani De regimine principum libri III, per Fr, 
Hieronymum Samaritanium Senensem, apud Bartholomaeum Zannettum, Romae 
1607, III.2, cap. 14, p. 488.
29 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cap, XXXIV, p. 228: “Y no es necesario lo 
qüe hacen muchos políticos de este tiempo, los cuales con doctrina pretenden hacer 
los hijos de rey sumamente prudentes, sabios, justos, cautos, inteligentes, doctos,
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Although the king portrayed in Pérez de Mesa’s text draws on 
many elements of the medieval Aristotelian tradition, such a portra­
yal owes much to the historical and political reality in which Pérez 
de Mesa lives. Unsurprisingly enough, some of the main concerns ad­
dressed in the Política o razón de Estado are related to such questions 
as how can the state last, how can it get stronger by expanding its 
borders without risking its stability or its very existence, how can it 
succeed in facing confederations of small states, and how can it stren­
gthen itself within its borders by averting or annulling the effects of 
contrary forces (among such forces, religion is the most deleterious).
Clearly, in both the medieval commentary tradition on the 
Politics and in Pérez de Mesa, stability is the foremost aim to be 
pursued30. Thus, for both Pérez de Mesa and the medieval com­
mentators, the aim of a good ruler is to ensure the conservation of 
the state rather than to increase his power at any cost. However, 
to assure such an aim, Pérez de Mesa considers that the perfect 
and ideal ruler described in Peter of Auvergne’s commentary is 
completely impractical.
It is by examining the different features the two authors focus 
on when describing the ideal ruler that we can observe the gap 
between their visions. For Peter of Auvergne, reason and will are 
indistinguishable in the ideal ruler, since his will cannot be but 
coincident with his reason; by contrast Pérez de Mesa describes the 
ruler’s will merely in terms of personal will. Accordingly, while for 
Peter the ideal ruler is as the guardian of justice, so that turning 
into him is the same as turning to living justice ( iustum anima- 
turn)31, for Pérez de Mesa appealing to the ruler’s will entails the
valientes, y con tantos otros adminículos y juntas que vengan a ser el rey ideal de 
Aristóteles; lo cual moralmente hablando es imposible hacer en um muchacho que 
apenas entiende lo que significan los nombres de aquellas cosas y es imposible poder 
imprimir todas aquellas perfecciones en um hombre, aunque viva doscientos anos”,
30 It should be noted that Pérez de Mesa does not neglect happiness as the aim 
to be achieved in the political community. Significantly, the chapters on happiness 
in the Política o razón de Estado hinges on Peter’s commentary. See Diego Pérez 
de Mesa, Política, capp. XLIV-XLVI, pp. 259*276 and the corresponding pages of 
Peter of Auvergne’s commentary (Petrus de Alvernia, Scrip turn, cit., VII, capp. 1-2; 
cf, Spiazzi 21966, pp. 337-350).
31 “Et dicit <Aristoteles> quod officíum regis est esse custodem iustitie. Et uult 
custos esse iusti. Et ideo recurrere ad regem est recurrere ad iustum animdtum. 
Et hoc apparet quia rex intendit bonum commune custodire et seruare. Hoc autem 
non potest nisi sit custos iusti” (Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, cit., V, cap, 8; cf. 
Spiazzi 31966, p. 284, nr. 849).
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risk of relying on personal impulse and unpredictable decision32. 
The ruler’s will must be regulated and restricted by the laws, this 
being the sole way to safeguard the stability of the state. Even in 
the case the king were a stone, if he would abide by the laws he 
would not jeopardise the preservation of his state33. Peter of Au­
vergne’s ideal ruler rules over his state not like a private person, 
but according to reason; on the contrary, Pérez de Mesa’s ruler is 
just a private person, unable to rule by himself: only if his actions 
and decisions rely on the State Council (Consejo de Estado) and he 
forms a unity with the council, will he be able to rule in conformity 
with justice and equity. The State Council, and not the prince, is 
the supreme authority, because the power of the State Council is 
the only power whose action does not consider only one or few parts 
of the state, but all of them together.
As noted earlier, Peter does not conceal that it is hard to find 
the most virtuous man, but he is more concerned in stressing that 
a particular matter needs to be receptive to a particular constitu­
tional form34. For Pérez de Mesa such a man simply does not exist: 
the perfect ruler of the Aristotelian tradition represents an abs­
tract, unattainable ideal. Yet, while such perfection does not exist 
in one single man alone, it nevertheless exists in reality: it occurs 
when the ruler acts together with the State Council. Pérez de Mesa 
thus transfers to this supreme power what Peter of Auvergne had 
assigned to the single perfectly virtuous ruler: if the ruler acts in 
concord with the State Council, he becomes the Aristotelian ideal 
and divine ruler, having all the perfections and virtues suitable to
32 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit, cap. XXXII, pp. 212-213: “Y como cada 
príncipe es de su humor y juzga de las cosas diferentemente, nace que lo que hoy 
se condena mañana se aprueba por bueno o se disimula, De lo qual nacen grandes 
inconvenientes” .
33 Ibid., cap. XXXIV, p. 228: “En suma, aunque el rey sea una piedra, como 
la que representaba en un carro al Conde Fernán González de Castilla, con que 
gobierne con las leyes de su reino y no quiera tomarse más dominio, se conservará 
en su Estado”.
34 “ [*..] &d legislatorem, cuius est bonum ciuitatis procurare, pertinet consid­
erare ipsam ciuitatem et quantum ad fortitudinem que est ex situ et quantum ad 
ordinationem politie, et etiam modum hominum, quem habent ex naturali inclina- 
tione, et aliam communicationem eorum ad inuicem et alios, scilicet ad quam uitam 
ordinabiles sunt ex natura: omnibus istis pensatis, siue sit Optima simpliciter siue 
optima hiis, et tunc ordinare leges et statuta per que poterunt attingere ad hanc 
optimam uitam et felicitatem conuenientes sibi” (Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, cit., 
VII, cap. 2; cf. Spiazzi 21966 p. 347, nr. 1073).
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his heroic majesty; for this reason he deserves to be obeyed, loved 
and respected by his subjects35.
In this way, Pérez de Mesa subverts the medieval distinction 
between regimen regale and regimen politicum: he does not say it 
explicitly, but by framing kingship in terms of rule of law, he identi­
fies it with a regimen politicum. This does not mean that he rejects 
Aristotle and medieval Aristotelianism, because here he is simply 
proceeding as numerous authors did before him: he is merely adjus­
ting the Aristotelian text to his own purposes36.
The Highest Risk for the Stability of the State: “tentar
novedades”
In Chapter 54, Pérez de Mesa offers his definition of reason of 
state, which for him consists fin ruling according to justice over 
subjects who submit themselves voluntarily to the ruler, according 
to the form of government they follow and they have chosen to 
adopt5’37. Simple as this definition may seem, it gives rise to some 
questions. First, what does it mean “to rule according to justice” ; 
second, what is the sense of the specification “according to the form 
of government they follow and they have chosen to adopt”? The 
answer to these questions can be found, once again, in the com­
mentary tradition on the Politics. Actually, these two assertions 
can be associated, because as Aristotle underlines in Chapter 9 of 
Book V each form of government has its own specific justice. As 
noted earlier, the medieval commentators made sense of this by
35 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit., cap. LIV, p. 314: “Pero el Consejo de 
Estado es general y superior a todos, porque no mira una sola parte de aquéllas 
sino todas juntas. Y así este Conséjo es el ánima del príncipe supremo que debe 
saber todo lo que el príncipe sabe y todo lo que ignora, sin el cual Consejo el prínc­
ipe sería como un hombre particular inepto al gobierno. Pero con este Consejo, 
siendo el que debe, el príncipe viene a ser aquel rey divino o ideal de Aristóteles 
de virtudes perfectas y majestad heroica, digno de ser de todos obedecido, amado 
y reverenciado”.
36 As is well known, the translation of the Politics into Latin gave rise to a 
tradition of thought which was not homogeneous, but which integrated different el­
ements and which originated contrasting views. For instance, the Politics was used 
to support kingship but also the republic as the best regime. On this, see Gianfranco 
Fioravanti, “La Política aristotélica nel Medioevo: linee di una ricezione”, Rivista 
di storia della filosofía 52 (1997) 17-29.
37 Diego Pérez de Mesa, Política, cit., cap. LIV, p. 313.
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using the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid. The 
criteria employed to allocate goods within the community and the 
aims specific to a given form of government may not be simpliciter 
good, but they are still just secundum quid. Each form of gover­
nment has therefore a form of justice-either secundum quid or 
simpliciter— thus each form has its own reason of state too. In 
this regard, Pérez de Mesa follows the Italian authors who wrote 
on the reason of state.
As we have seen, for Pérez de Mesa the ideal monarchy depicted 
by Peter of Auvergne is unattainable. This along with the assumption 
that different regimes may seek for different kinds of realisation of 
justice explains why stability becomes dominant in Pérez de Mesa’s 
text (and also in the commentaries on the Politics). In this sense, it is 
unsurprising that he concentrates on Book V of the Politics, the book 
in which Aristotle examines all the causes that drive the parts of the 
commonwealth (whether individual or social groups) to dissension. 
Just like other authors of the reason of state, Pérez de Mesa stresses 
that the major threat for the political community is the introduction 
of novelties (novedades): it does not matter whether those innovations 
are good or bad; in any case they introduce an element which can 
potentially subvert the order of the state. In this regard, the ruler 
should never concede privileges to courts or to any other group or 
guild, because it may bring disparities; furthermore, the ruler must 
not allow that a social group or corporation acquire too much power38; 
if this happens, it is necessary to find another group that may serve 
as counterweight, because only in this way will it be possible to avoid 
a situation in which either group may cause novedades. Pérez de 
Mesa adds here examples from his own time: the balance between 
Franciscans and Dominicans and the equilibrium between the Ge­
novese families (the Marquis Spinola raised by the king of Spain in 
order to counterbalance the power of the Doria family)39.
38 Ibid., cap. XXXI, p. 205: “A este capitulo de la negligencia se puede reducir 
asimismo el poco advertimiento que algunas veces tienen los príncipes en conceder 
ciertos privilegios a diferentes tribunales, colegios o comunidades, por causa de los 
cuales privilegios aquellos tribunales se encuentran y vienen a inquietar y causar 
escándalos y tumultos importantes en el pueblo, con que viniendo a las armas dan 
ocasión de pésimas consecuencias, máxime cuando el Estado o algunos poderosos 
esperan semejante ocasión para tentar novedades".
39 Ibid., cap. XXXII, pp. 219-220: “Si alguna comunidad por su grande potencia 
se ensoberbeciere y no procediere bien, se le deben ir quitando los favores y honras 
que tiene o suele recibir, y con ellas se ha de levantar y contrapesar otra comunidad 
o parcialidad para que ni la una ni la otra puedan con la grande potencia causar
DIEGO PÉREZ DE MESA'S POLÍTICA O RAZÓN DE ESTADO 51
The exhortation that the ruler ought not to introduce innova­
tions is found in Bolero’s Della ragion di statom and runs through 
the works influenced by Botero41. Pérez de Mesa shares many ele­
ments with some of the treatises of the reason of state, principally 
with those written by Pietro Andrea Canonieri, Scipione Chiara- 
monti, Lodovico Zuccolo and Lodo vico Settala. This is because, as 
in Pérez de Mesa’s text, the structure of the works of these authors 
owes a great deal to the Politics. Pérez de Mesa had possibly one (or 
more) of these works upon his desk and might have drawn on it just 
as he drew on Peter of Auvergne’s commentary. Thus far no scholar 
has carried out a comparative analysis between Pérez de Mesa and 
those authors. It is clear in any case that what I have shown here 
with regard to the Política o razón de Estado should be extended to 
the texts of those authors, namely that they also need to be studied 
against the background of the commentaries on the Politics.
Conclusion
It is not easy to characterise the work of Pérez de Mesa: is it 
a re as on-of-state treatise, a sort of commentary on the Politics, or 
a sort of abridgment of it? Irrespective of our characterisation, the 
Política o razón de Estado sacada de Aristóteles can be fully con­
sidered as an example of how the Politics and its most successful 
commentary, written in the Middle Ages by Aquinas and Peter of 
Auvergne, were received. On account of the evidence provided in 
this article, the connection that scholars have established between 
the end of ‘Political Aristotelianism” and the emergence of reason of 
state should be redefined, or at least qualified. This is not to suggest 
that works such as the Politicfi o razón de Estado are a mere con­
tinuation of the medieval commentaries on the Politics; it suffices 
to recall that Pérez de Mesa has to deal with issues that are totally 
absent from the text of the Politics (take the case of religion as the
novedades. Con levantar el rey de España al Marqués Espinola se ha templado 
y contrapesado la demasiada potencia de la familia de los Dorias, sospechosa a 
genoveses. El decreto de Gregorio XV en la cosa de la Concepción ha oprimido y 
contrapesado a los dominicos con los franciscanos” .
40 It is precisely the title of chapter 9 of the second part of Giovanni Botero, 
Della ragion di stato libri dieci, in Vene ria: appresso i Gioliti, 1589, p. 72.
41 On this, see Gianfranco Borrelli, Non far novità. Alle radici della cultura 
italiana della conservazione politica, Bibliopoìis, Napoli 2000.
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most dangerous cause of sedition; the problem of heresy; or the 
controversies opposing the different religious orders). What is im­
portant to stress here is that in the early seventeenth century Pérez 
de Mesa still drew on a medieval scholastic and university text—a 
commentary on the Politics—to construct a practical treatise on the 
conservation of power for an audience broader than the university. 
It is remarkable that he turned to a medieval text to cope with the 
most pressing question of the seventeenth century, that is, how to 
conserve power and to avert political turmoil. This tells us that the 
division between medieval and early modern is more complex than 
has usually been assumed in the scholarship. Moreover, throughout 
the whole reception of Aristotle’s Politics from the late thirteenth 
century onward, the insertion of elements which are in no way re­
lated to Aristotle, and the adaption of Aristotle’s ideas to different 
contexts, is perfectly common; in fact, it was these two factors that 
assured the Politics its importance during those centuries.
RESUMEN
A obra Política o razón de Estado sacada de Aristóteles, escrita por 
Diego Pérez de Mesa, não apenas é amplamente baseada na Política de 
Aristóteles, como o seu título o reconhece abertamente, mas também no 
mais influente comentario medieval à Política, ou seja, o comentário inicia­
do por Tomás de Aquino e finalizado por Pedro de Auvergne, algo, a propó­
sito, que Pérez de Mesa deixou de reconhecer. Neste artigo, eu mostro os 
modos diversos em que Pérez de Mesa se baseia nesse comentário: algumas 
vezes, ele o reproduz verbatim ou tira linhas de raciocínio a partir dele, ao 
passo que em outras ocasiões ele o critica, particularmente com respeito 
ao delineamento que o comentário oferece sobre o governante ideal. Para 
Pérez de Mesa, o governante ideal tem origem na unidade formada entre 
o governante e o Conselho de Estado, devendo haver regência de acordo 
com a lei, e não, como Pedro de Auvergne tinha sustentado, de acordo com 
a própria vontade e o próprio intelecto do governante. Apesar da crítica 
que Pérez de Mesa faz à representação que Pedro de Auvergne fizera do 
governante perfeito, é notável que um tratado sobre razão de estado se 
fundamente tão fortemente em um comentário aristotélico medieval. O 
vínculo entre razão de estado e o fim do “Arístoteiismo Político” deveria, 
portanto, ser reconsiderado.
